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1 Introduction
There is a broad literature addressing the many functions of middlemen. They
have been shown to reduce search costs (Rubinstein and Wolinksy, 1987; Yavas,
1992, 1994), to oﬀer expertise in markets with adverse selection (Biglaiser, 1993),
to operate as guarantors of quality under producer moral hazard (Biglaiser and
Friedman, 1994), as well as to operate as investors in quality-testing technology
(Li, 1998). More recently, Shevchenko (2004) endogenises the number of inter-
mediaries who buy and sell goods and examines the optimality of the size and
composition of their inventories. Common to all of these works is the explo-
ration of the role of middlemen as buyers and sellers of goods. In contrast, this
paper explores the role of intermediaries as brokers of information.
Information is required to identify profitable trading opportunities and lo-
cate suitable trading partners, particularly where goods are diﬀerentiated and
information about product characteristics is important. Information asymme-
tries, coupled with costs of acquiring information, can hinder the matching of
agents with opportunities and prevent prices from allocating scarce resources
across countries. Portes and Rey (2005) point to a lack of information about
international trading opportunities and the need to tap into ‘deep knowledge’.
In such a setting, international trade can be facilitated through intermediaries
who invest in information networks or contacts and match agents with suitable
opportunities for a fee.
Rauch and Watson (2002) present some summary statistics from a pilot sur-
vey of international trade intermediaries based in the US. Despite the small
number of observations, their evidence suggests that 50% of trade interme-
diation in diﬀerentiated products does not involve taking title of goods and
reselling, as compared to only 1% for homogeneous-goods. Moreover, 36% of
the revenue from trade intermediation of diﬀerentiated products is reported to
come from success fees based on the value of transactions, while the figure for
homogeneous-good intermediation is only 1%. This is consistent with the search
based or network view of trade, pioneered by Rauch (2001), Rauch and Trindade
(2000) and others, that posits that the information requirements for diﬀerenti-
ated goods are much greater due to the need to match specific characteristics.
The evidence to date supports this, pointing to a more pronounced role for
information intermediaries in the trade of diﬀerentiated goods.
The facilitation of trade through information networks has only recently
begun to be formally developed. Recent literature on networks in international
trade (Casella and Rauch, 2002) focuses on gaining insight on how information-
sharing networks among internationally dispersed ethnic minorities or business
groups can overcome informal trade barriers such as inadequate information
about trading opportunities and weak enforcement of international contracts
(Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002).
Casella and Rauch (2002) develop a model where output is produced through
a joint venture and agents cannot judge the quality of their match abroad. They
show that introducing a subset of agents with social ties, who have complete
information when it comes to matching with other group members, increases
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aggregate trade and income, but hurts the anonymous market. More recently,
Rauch and Watson (2002) model the supply of ‘network intermediation’ where
agents endogenously choose whether to be producers or intermediaries, depend-
ing on their endowment of contacts. The emphasis of the existing literature has
largely been the eﬀects of pre-existing social ties or contacts on trade. This pa-
per contributes to the literature by analysing the incentives for contact-building
and exploring how trade intermediation can oﬀer a more eﬃcient means of trade
matching, without relying on any pre-existing ties between agents.
This paper analyses the role of information costs on the incentives for in-
formation intermediaries to emerge as trade facilitators and addresses a broad
range of issues in a tractable, unified, theoretical framework. First, the model
sheds light on how barriers to information flow can aﬀect trade patterns and
the organisation of trade, either directly, or indirectly through an intermediary.
Second, it explores the incentives for contact-building and intermediation with
varying levels of information costs and for a broad range of parameter values
reflecting diﬀerent network-building technologies. The pairwise matching model
developed contributes to the literature by showing how information costs aﬀect
the realisation and organisation of trade transactions, for a given set of trade
opportunities, in a framework where the pattern of information intermediation
is determined endogenously.
The model is particularly applicable to international trade in diﬀerentiated
goods for which information about product characteristics is important. The
model can also be applied more broadly to intermediated markets where contact-
building and matching are key. Examples may include headhunters in the job
market, real estate agents in the housing or rental market, charterers in the
transportation market, matchmakers in the marriage market (in some cultures),
among others.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the
intermediation model. Section 3 extends the network-building cost specification
giving rise to a richer set of results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
This section introduces a pairwise matching model with a continuum of im-
porters and exporters, and a single trade intermediary. The framework captures
the incentives for network-building and intermediation when there are barriers
to the flow of information and sheds light on the role information costs play on
the organisation of trade.
2.1 Model Set-up
Consider a two-sided market where importers and exporters match in pairs
to exchange a single unit of output. Let there be a continuum of exporters
(X), distributed uniformly and with unit density, over the interval [0, 1] and a
continuum of importers (M), also distributed uniformly with unit density over
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[0, 1]. Suppose that for each trader there is a unique partner on the other side
of the market with whom they can trade. Each trade transaction generates a
joint surplus S > 0, but if agents fail to locate their match they receive a payoﬀ
of 0. Moreover, assume all market participants are risk-neutral.
The framework best reflects trade in diﬀerentiated goods where specific char-
acteristics have to be matched, whether these are feature of the product, timing
of delivery etc. In the absence of trade frictions, importers and exporters iden-
tify each other costlessly and all trade opportunities are exploited generating a
total surplus of S.
Suppose there is two-sided information asymmetry such that traders on both
sides of the market do not know the location of their partner on the other side
of the market. Within the set of infinitely many traders, the probability of each
exporter (importer) locating her partner by selecting a random trader from the
measure of importers (exporters) is zero. Any pair j of trade partners (Xj ,Mj)
is assumed to be able to match through a direct matching technology, how-
ever, which achieves successful matching with probability q(i), where parameter
i ∈ [0, 1] reflects the level of information costs or barriers to information flow
between the two sides of the market. Let q0(i) < 0, so a higher prevailing
level of information costs implies a lower probability of matching for each pair.
Parameter i may be interpreted as reflecting the state of information and com-
munication technology (ICT). An ICT improvement reflects a decline in i, which
in turn implies a higher probability of a direct match. Further, let q(1) = 0 and
q(0) = 1, so information cost level i = 1 prohibits any matching, while i = 0
corresponds to the full information case where all trade opportunities are ex-
ploited. q(i) is also the expected trade volume and q(i)S the expected joint
surplus from direct trade. The two-sided market is represented in figure (1).
0 1
0 1
Importers (M)
Exporters (X)
i
Xj
Mj
q(i)S
Figure 1: The two-sided market with pairwise trade matches.
Suppose the market has a single intermediary (I) with access to a technology
4
for developing contacts with importers and exporters and finding out their trade
characteristics (location, product features etc.). The intermediary incurs a set
up cost, F , for creating a network and a marginal cost of network expansion,
c (i), where c0 (i) > 0 and c (0) = 0. The cost of making contacts is assumed
to increase monotonically with the level of information costs but assumed to be
entirely costless when i = 0.
The intermediary’s network is denoted by a measure of importers, PM , and
a measure of exporters, PX , where PM ∈ [0, 1] and PX ∈ [0, 1], contacted by
incurring cost c (i)PM and c (i)PX , respectively. Let C (PX , PM ) denote the
intermediary’s total investment cost for building a network of contacts of size
{PX , PM}, where this is linear and described by (1):
C (PX , PM ) = F + c (i) (PX + PM ) (1)
Once network investment costs are sunk, it is assumed costless for the in-
termediary to match trade pairs from within his network of contacts. The
intermediary’s marginal cost of trade intermediation is zero. The proportion
PX also reflects the ex ante probability that any particular exporter Xj is a
network member. Similarly, PM is the ex ante probability that any particular
importer Mj is a network member. Thus, PXPM describes the ex ante joint
probability that both trade partners in pair (Xj ,Mj) are contacted by the in-
termediary, for given network size. Once uncertainty regarding the identity of
network members is resolved, the intermediary is able to match trade pairs from
within his network1 with probability 1.
The intermediary raises revenue by charging a commission for matching trad-
ing partners through his network. Let αI denote the share of trade surplus, or
commission rate, that the intermediary demands for successful intermediation
of trade. The intermediary’s power to extract trade surplus through αI is con-
strained by the traders’ outside option to trade directly with probability q(i). In
particular, as direct matching prospects worsen with i, the highest commission
rate consistent with trader participation increases.
2.1.1 Timing of the Game
The timing of the game between traders and intermediary I is as follows:
Stage 1 - Network investment: The intermediary invests in a network of
size {PX , PM} by contacting a proportion of importers and exporters.
Network investment costs, C (PX , PM ), are sunk. The intermediary oﬀers
contacts a take-it-or-leave-it contract specifying commission rate αI for
successful matching.
Stage 2 - Contracting: Traders in receipt of a contract accept or reject it.
1This assumption can easily be relaxed so that indirect matching takes place with a prob-
ability less than or equal to 1 but higher than the probability of a direct match.
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Stage 3 - Indirect trade: Uncertainty over which trade matches are feasible
through the network is resolved. The intermediary matches pairs of traders
in his network, provided both parties accepted in stage 2.
Stage 4 - Direct trade: Any unmatched traders trade directly with proba-
bility q(i).
2.1.2 Equilibrium Concept
The solution concept used is subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) and the method
employed is backward induction. A strategy for intermediary I is a set {PX(i), PX(i), αI(i)}
that describes network size and commission rate, given information costs i. A
strategy for trader j is described by a ruleRa for accepting or rejecting a contract
in stage 2, if such a contract is received. A set of strategies {P ∗X(i), P ∗X(i), α∗I(i), R∗a}
can be said to form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game if under these
strategies the expected profit of the intermediary and the expected trade surplus
of each trader are maximised, given the strategies of all other players.
2.2 Direct and Indirect Trade
The pool of unmatched traders in the final stage of the game includes three
groups of traders: (a) those not contacted in stage 1, (b) those contacted but who
rejected the contract in stage 2, and (c) those who were contacted and accepted,
but could not be matched through the network in stage 3. Unmatched traders
can expect to match directly with probability q(i) in the final stage of the game.
Each direct match generates S, so the ex ante expected surplus from the direct
trade route is q(i)S. Let αX and αM denote the surplus shares of exporters
and importers, respectively, where αX + αM = 1. For simplicity, assume both
parties have equal bargaining power so gains from any transaction are split
evenly2, such that αX = αM = 12 . The expected payoﬀs from direct trade for
importers and exporters, denoted by EDT (ΠM ) and EDT (ΠX), respectively,
can thus be expressed as:
EDT (ΠX) = EDT (ΠM ) =
1
2
q(i)S (2)
Intermediated trade transactions in stage 3 between network members who
accept in stage 2 also generate S per match. Since traders are identical in
terms of their future trade prospects, they all either accept or reject the take-
it-or-leave-it oﬀer in stage 2. The intermediary maximises stage 1 expected
profit subject to participation constraints, thereby ensuring that all traders
contacted by the intermediary find it optimal to accept in equilibrium. Let αj
denote the share of trade surplus captured by j, given information costs i, where
2The particular values of αX and αM have no bearing on the intermediary’s investment
decision, or choice of commission rate. Symmetry is assumed for simplicity.
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j = {X,M, I}. As with direct trade, exporters and importers are assumed to
split (residual) surplus equally, so αX = αM ≡ αT . It follows that:
2αT + αI = 1 (3)
Traders’ expected payoﬀs from indirect trade, denoted by EIT (ΠM ) and
EIT (ΠX), respectively, can thus be expressed as:
EIT (ΠX) = EIT (ΠM ) =
1
2
(1− αI)S (4)
The measure of intermediated transactions, for any given network size, will
vary in stage 3 depending on the degree of overlap between the two groups of
contacts. Hence, the measure of intermediated trade matches, denoted by TI ,
is a random variable. For any network of size (PX , PM ), the largest measure
of matches possible through the network is min {PX , PM}, reflecting the maxi-
mal measure of overlap between importer and exporter contacts. Similarly, the
smallest measure of matches that may arise is max {PX + PM − 1, 0}, where
mismatch between the two contact groups is greatest.
For any pair (Xj ,Mj), the ex ante probability of matching through the
intermediary is given by the joint probability of both partners being contacted
by the intermediary in stage 1, PXPM . The probability of any pair j matching
is integrated over the range of possible pairs to give the expected measure of
intermediated matches E(TI) = PXPM .
In equilibrium, the intermediary builds contacts symmetrically in order to
maximise E(TI), for any given network investment. Thus, PX = PM ≡ P .
Hence, the expected measure of intermediated matches is E(TI) = P 2.
Proposition (1) establishes the optimality of a symmetric network, allowing
the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy set to be redefined as {P ∗(i), α∗I(i), R∗a}.
Proposition 1 It is optimal for the trade intermediary to invest symmetrically
in network-building on both sides of the market, such that PX = PM ≡ P , where
P ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Consider a network of size (PX , PM ) from which a measure of trade
matches E(TI) = PXPM is expected. The intermediary can maximise the return
from his network investment by choosing PX and PM to maximise E(TI), given
C (PX , PM ) = F+c (i) (PX + PM ). The first order conditions of the constrained
optimisation yield PX = PM as the trade maximising network configuration.
Proposition (1) follows directly.
For any exporter (importer) evaluating whether to sign up with the interme-
diary in stage 2, the probability of her partner also being in the network is P .
Each exporter (or importer) can expect to receive EIT (ΠX) (or EIT (ΠM )) with
probability P and EDT (ΠX) (or EDT (ΠM )) with probability 1−P . Hence, the
expected payoﬀ of exporterXj (or importerMj), conditional on being contacted
by the intermediary in stage 1, is given by:
E(ΠXj |Xj ∈ P ) = E(ΠMj |Mj ∈ P ) =
1
2
[P (1− αI) + (1− P )q(i)]S (5)
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Contrasting the expected payoﬀs described by equations (2) and (5) yields
proposition (2).
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the intermediary oﬀers contracts demanding
commission rate α∗I(i) = 1− q(i). All contracts are accepted.
Proof. To ensure trader participation in stage 2, the intermediary must
set αI suﬃciently low so that expected payoﬀ from signing up to the network,
described by equation (5), is at least as large as the expected payoﬀ from an
exclusively direct trade route, described by (2). The highest commission rate
consistent with trader participation is thus:
αI = 1− q(i) (6)
Hence, traders’ optimal acceptance rule R∗a in stage 2 is ‘accept the contract if
αI ≤ 1 − q(i); reject otherwise’. Anticipating the traders’ incentives in stage
2, the intermediary sets the largest participation-consistent commission rate3.
Hence, the intermediary α∗I(i) = 1− q(i) in stage 1 and all contracts oﬀered are
accepted in stage 2.
The intermediary is constrained by traders’ outside option to trade directly,
which in turn depends on the level of information costs. The worse are the
traders’ prospects in the market, the higher the commission rate the interme-
diary can charge and still ensure participation. Even though a larger network
improves the chances of an indirect trade match, the option to trade directly
remains available, so α∗I(i) is independent of P . Moreover, since all surplus over
and above that generated through direct trade is appropriated by the interme-
diary, all traders are indiﬀerent between trading directly or the possibility of
trading through the network.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, importers and exporters are indiﬀerent ex ante
between the prospect of direct matching only and having the opportunity to trade
both directly and indirectly.
Proof. At the outset of the game, anticipating a network of size P , any
pair (Xj,Mj) can expect to find themselves in one of four possible positions:
(i) with probability (1− P )2, both trade partners are outside the network; (ii)
with probability P (1− P ), Mj is inside the network and Xj outside; (iii) with
probability P (1 − P ), Xj is inside the network and Mj outside, and (iv) both
partners are members of the network, with probability P 2. The expected payoﬀ
for each partner is 12q(i)S in (i)-(iii) and
1
2 (1− αI)S in (iv). Weighing the
expected payoﬀs with their respective probabilities yields the ex ante expected
payoﬀ to any trader j at the outset of the game, given P . This is summarised
by:
E(ΠXj | P ) = E(ΠMj | P ) =
1
2
£
q(i)(1− P 2) + (1− αI)P 2
¤
S (7)
3Assume that when indiﬀerent between the two modes of trade, traders sign up with the
intermediary. Alternatively, the intermediary could oﬀer an infinitesimally small additional
amount, ε, to ensure traders sign up to the network.
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Anticipating that α∗I(i) = 1− q(i), equation (7) simplifies to give E(ΠX | P ) =
E(ΠM | P ) = 12q(i)S = EDT (ΠX) = EDT (ΠM ). Hence, traders are indiﬀerent
between having the prospect of intermediated trade, or not.
2.3 Equilibrium Network Size
The intermediary chooses P ∈ [0, 1] to maximise expected profits (net of network
investment cost), E(ΠI), subject to α∗I(i) = 1 − q(i) and R∗a, where expected
profit can be expressed by:
E(ΠI) = [1− q(i)]SP 2 − 2c(i)P − F (8)
The specification does not yield an interior equilibrium for P , as verified by
the non-negative second order condition4. Hence, the intermediary chooses to
develop contacts with all traders, or none, depending on the level of information
costs. When profitable at the margin, the network expands to include all traders,
provided the measure of trade matches is suﬃciently large to cover set up costs.
Otherwise, no contacts are developed at all, and the intermediary is inactive.
Which of the two corner equilibria prevails hinges on the relative magnitude
of two conflicting eﬀects of i on expected profits. The greater the prevailing
barriers to information flow, the higher are the costs of network development.
At the same time, traders’ direct matching prospects worsen, thereby allowing
a higher commission rate to be charged. The net eﬀect of information costs
on E(ΠI) thus depends on the relative impact of i on q(i) and c(i). This is
summarised formally in proposition (4).
Proposition 4 Expected profit from intermediation is monotonically increasing
with the level of information costs if c0 (i) < −PS2 q0 (i), for P > 0.
Proof. Partially diﬀerentiating (8) with respect to i yields:
∂E(ΠI)
∂i
= − [2c0 (i) + PSq0 (i)]P (9)
It follows directly from (9) that E(ΠI) is monotonically increasing with i, if:
c0 (i) < −PS
2
q0 (i) , for P > 0 (10)
Let P ∗(i) describe the intermediary’s optimal network investment strategy
for any i ∈ [0, 1]. This defines the equilibrium network path P ∗(i) in the sub-
game perfect equilibrium. The parameter space can be partitioned into two sets;
the set of parameters for which condition (10) is satisfied, denoted by (A0), and
the set for which it is not, denoted by (B0). For each set there exists a unique
equilibrium pattern of intermediation.
4The second order condition is non-negative for all values of information cost i and network
size P : ∂
2E(ΠI)
∂2P
= 2S [1− q (i)] ≥ 0.
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Equilibrium path (A0) arises for parameter values that satisfy condition (10)
and thus for which the intermediary’s expected profit is increasing in information
costs i. Hence, for suﬃciently small network set-up costs, F , relative to trade
surplus, S, there is a threshold level of information costs, bi ∈ [0, 1], above which
the intermediary finds it profitable to invest in an information network spanning
the entire market and below which the intermediary is inactive. Moreover, the
higher the trade surplus relative to fixed costs, the lower the threshold above
which the intermediary is active.
Equilibrium path (B0) arises where expected profit fails to satisfy condition
(10), so expected profit is decreasing with information costs. This describes the
case where the negative eﬀect of higher i on network investment cost outweighs
the positive eﬀect on revenue from the ability to set a higher commission rate.
Hence, for suﬃciently small network set-up costs relative to trade surplus, there
is a threshold level of information costs, i ∈ [0, 1], below which the intermediary
finds it profitable to invest in an information network that covers the entire
market. The intermediary’s network investment is constrained by market size,
yielding a constrained expected profit E(ΠI)|P=1, which is non-monotonic in i,
and which yields a threshold level i < i, below which the market size constraint
is so restrictive that positive profits cannot be attained. Hence, in equilibrium
(B0), a trade network is only viable for values of i that lie between the two
thresholds.
Propositions (5) and (6) characterise the two equilibrium patterns of inter-
mediation.
Proposition 5 If expected profits are monotonically increasing in i, then equi-
librium network size, P ∗, expected trade, E∗(T ), and expected welfare, E∗(W ),
are:
P ∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if i ∈
h
0,min
³bi, 1´i
1 if i ∈
h
min
³bi, 1´ , 1i
E∗(T ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
q(i) if i ∈
h
0,min
³bi, 1´i
1 if i ∈
h
min
³bi, 1´ , 1i
E∗(W ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
q(i)S if i ∈
h
0,min
³bi, 1´i
S − 2c(i)− F if i ∈
h
min
³bi, 1´ , 1i
where bi is the positive threshold level of information costs that solves c(i) +p
c(i)2 + [1− q(i)]SF = [1− q(i)]S, above which E(ΠI) > 0.
Proof. Setting expected profit in equation (8) to zero, E(ΠI) = 0 simplifies
to give the following quadratic expression in P :
[1− q(i)]SP 2 − 2c(i)P − F = 0 (11)
Equation (11) describes the combinations of i and P for which E(ΠI) = 0.
Hence, equation (11) implicitly defines the iso-profit contour in (i, P ) space,
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along which expected profits are zero. Let bP (i) denote the positive, real root of
(11), given i and in terms parameters of the model, where:
bP (i) = c(i) +pc(i)2 + [1− q(i)]SF
[1− q(i)]S > 0 (12)
bP (i) gives a measure of the market size that would, given i, generate exactly
enough revenue to cover the network set-up cost and variable costs. It can be
interpreted as the minimum network size consistent with E(ΠI) ≥ 0, given i.
If bP (i) ≤ 1, then the revenue generated from the unit measure of traders is
suﬃcient to cover network costs so the intermediary invests in a trade network
spanning the entire market (P ∗ = 1). Conversely, for i where bP (i) > 1, the
measure of traders is not large enough for a viable network, so P ∗ = 0.
If condition (10) holds for all values of i > 0, then there is a unique value
of i, bi, that solves bP (i) = 1 at which E(ΠI) = 0. It follows that E(ΠI) ≥ 0 for
i ≥ bi and E(ΠI) < 0 for i < bi. Hence, P ∗ = 1 for values of i where bP (i) ≤ 1
and 0 otherwise.
If P ∗ = 0, then there is no intermediated trade. Expected trade volume is
thus q (i) direct matches, generating an expected surplus of q (i)S. If P ∗ = 1,
then the intermediary can match all pairs. It follows that all trade is interme-
diated and trade volume is 1. The expected welfare is the surplus generated
from trade, S, less the network costs incurred by the intermediary. Hence,
E∗(W ) = S − 2c(i)− F when the intermediary is active.
Proposition 6 If expected profits are non-monotonic in i, then equilibrium net-
work size, P ∗, expected trade, E∗(T ), and expected welfare, E∗(T ), are:
P ∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if i ∈ [0,min (i, 1)]
1 if i ∈
£
min (i, 1) ,min
¡
i, 1
¢¤
0 if i ∈
£
min
¡
i, 1
¢
, 1
¤
E∗(T ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
q(i) if i ∈ [0,min (i, 1)]
1 if i ∈
£
min (i, 1) ,min
¡
i, 1
¢¤
q(i) if i ∈
£
min
¡
i, 1
¢
, 1
¤
E∗(W ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
q(i)S if i ∈ [0,min (i, 1)]
S − 2c(i)− F if i ∈
£
min (i, 1) ,min
¡
i, 1
¢¤
q(i)S if i ∈
£
min
¡
i, 1
¢
, 1
¤
where i and i are positive roots of c(i) +
p
c(i)2 + [1− q(i)]SF = [1− q(i)]S,
between which E(ΠI) > 0.
Proof. If c0 (i) < −PS2 q0 (i) for i ∈
h
0,eii and c0 (i) ≥ −PS2 q0 (i) for i ∈ hei, 1i,
given P > 0, then expected profit is non-monotonic in i and there are, in general,
two positive, real roots of bP (i) = 1. Let the two roots be defined as i and i,
respectively, where i > i > 0 and ei ∈ £i, i¤. It follows that E(ΠI) ≥ 0 for
i ∈
£
i, i
¤
, and E(ΠI) < 0, otherwise. Hence, P ∗ = 1 for i ∈
£
i, i
¤
, and 0
otherwise. E∗(T ) and E∗(W ) follow directly.
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2.3.1 Trade and Welfare
Since any unmatched network members in stage 3 continue to have the opportu-
nity to trade directly in stage 4, expected trade can never be lower with an active
intermediary in the market than without. This is formalised in proposition (7).
Proposition 7 An active intermediary raises expected trade volume unambigu-
ously compared to expected trade when only direct trade is possible.
Proof. Let E(T ) denote expected trade volume. Investment in a network
of size P , where P ∈ [0, 1], generates P 2 expected indirect matches in stage 3.
A proportion q(i) of the remaining 1 − P 2 pairs trade directly in stage 4. It
follows that:
E(T ) = q(i) + P 2 [1− q(i)] (13)
≥ q(i) = EDT (T )
Expected trade volume with an intermediary is thus at least as large as when
only direct trade is possible, for any choice of network size P . Moreover, ex-
pected trade is unambiguously higher when the intermediary is active (P > 0).
The intermediary exploits his monopoly power and sets a commission rate
that leaves traders as well oﬀ (in expected terms) under the intermediation
contract as through direct trade. Hence, the intermediary’s expected profit rep-
resents a pure welfare gain. The gain arises from the fact that the intermediary
expands the set of possible production technologies for matching, while his ex-
clusive appropriation of these welfare gains stems from his market power from
being a monopolist provider5 of the indirect matching technology. Proposition
(8) formalises this discussion.
Proposition 8 An active intermediary raises expected welfare unambiguously
compared to expected welfare when only direct trade is possible.
Proof. Let EDT (W ) denote expected welfare arising from direct trade,
without an intermediary. This mirrors expected trade, and is given by:
EDT (W ) = q(i)S (14)
Further, let E(W ) denote expected welfare with a trade network of any size P ,
where P ∈ [0, 1]. The total surplus generated from direct and indirect trade is
P 2S and q(i)
¡
1− P 2
¢
S, respectively. Subtracting the intermediary’s network
costs gives:
5Chapter 2 analyses the competitive interaction of two intermediaries in the two-sided mar-
ket. For equilibria where both intermediaries are active, traders with access to intermediation
services are, on average, strictly better oﬀ than those with access to direct trade only.
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E(W ) =
¡
1− P 2
¢
q(i)S + P 2S − 2c(i)P − F (15)
Rearranging (15) gives:
E(W ) = q(i)S + [1− q(i)]SP 2 − 2c(i)P − F (16)
In equilibrium, P ∗ ≥ 0 ifE(ΠI) ≥ 0, in which case (8) implies that [1− q(i)]S (P ∗)2 ≥
2c(i)P ∗ − F . Moreover, for all values of i where E(ΠI) < 0, P ∗ = 0. Hence:
E∗(W ) = q(i)S + [1− q(i)]S (P ∗)2 − 2c(i)P ∗ − F (17)
≥ q(i)S = EDT (W )
Equilibrium expected welfare with an intermediary is thus at least as large as
expected welfare when only direct trade is possible. Moreover, for levels of
information costs where P ∗ > 0, expected welfare is unambiguously higher with
the intermediary. Proposition (8) follows directly.
2.3.2 Illustrative Examples
To provide further intuition an illustrative example is provided for each of the
two equilibrium patterns of intermediation. To add structure to the discussion,
let marginal cost of network expansion c(i) and direct matching probability q(i)
be specified as c(i) = iα and q (i) = 1−iδ, respectively, where α, δ ≥ 1. For these
specifications, equilibrium pattern (A0) arises where δ ≥ α, while equilibrium
pattern (B0) arises for parameter values where α > δ. For suﬃciently large
trader surplus S relative to network set-up cost F , the lower threshold levels
of information cost above which the intermediary is active lie within i ∈ [0, 1].
Consider the following illustrative examples for each case.
Equilibrium Intermediation Path (A0) Figure (2) illustrates the equilib-
rium path of network size with information costs, for which6 δ ≥ α and thus
where condition (10) is satisfied. A map of iso-profit contours is depicted where
the lowest corresponds to zero profits, and illustrates bP (i), the minimum net-
work size that allows the intermediary to break even. Threshold bi corresponds
to bP (i) = 1, below which the intermediary is inactive and above which network
size is 1. The higher cost implications of higher prevailing information costs are
dominated by the commission eﬀect through condition (10), so the intermediary
is active for all i ∈
hbi, 1i.
The corresponding expected trade pattern, E(T ), is illustrated in figure (3).
EDT (T ) depicts the declining expected trade path that would prevail without an
intermediary. Despite the relatively low level of information costs that prevail
6All figures for equilibrium (A0) are illustrated for S = 9, q(i) = 1 − i4, c(i) = i2 and
F = 0.001.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium A0: path of network size with information costs.
when the intermediary is inactive, a proportion of trade matches 1 − q(i) is
lost due to information frictions. As barriers to information flow worsen, an
increasing measure of transactions fail to materialise, enabling the intermediary
to become active beyond threshold bi. The network enables all trading pairs to
match indirectly, raising trade volume to 1, despite the larger frictions that a
higher i implies. Moreover, Figure (4) illustrates the positive welfare eﬀect of the
intermediary’s investment. Since profits from intermediation are monotonically
increasing in i, the welfare gain from intermediation increases as the barriers to
information flow become more severe.
Equilibrium Intermediation Path (B0) Consider the iso-profit map7 in
figure (5) that reflects the intermediary’s incentives where δ < α. For relatively
low levels of information costs i, expected profit is increasing with i. For this
range of information costs the revenue eﬀect of increasing information costs
outweighs the cost eﬀect. The trade-oﬀ between the two eﬀects worsens with
i, however, for any given network size P > 0, until the threshold is reached
above which the cost eﬀect outweighs the revenue eﬀect. A trade network is
thus unviable when information costs are very low (i < i), or very high (i > i).
Figures (6) and (7) illustrate the corresponding expected trade volume and
welfare eﬀects. The trade network represents a more eﬃcient information tech-
nology than direct matching, thereby improving welfare, but over a limited
range of i. The pattern of trade in equilibrium (B0) indicates that even small
7All figures for equilibrium (B0) are illustrated for S = 1.2, q(i) = 1 − i3, c(i) = i6 and
F = 0.005.
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changes in information costs may have dramatic implications for the organisa-
tion of trade between direct and indirect as a result of pivotal thresholds that
trigger network investment or, indeed, network collapse.
The model points to the possibility of a complete reorganisation of trade be-
yond threshold levels of information costs. The dramatic swings between direct
trade and intermediated trade result from the linear network cost specification.
Since both direct and intermediated trade is observed in practice, it is impor-
tant to examine the conditions under which an interior equilibrium exists and
how it may be aﬀected by information costs. In the next section, network size is
introduced as an argument of the intermediary’s cost function and the interior
equilibrium solved analytically under convexity in network-building costs. Note
that core propositions (7) and (8) do not rely on any assumptions on costs and
q (i), so continue to hold.
3 Convex Network-Building Costs
This section allows the intermediary’s costs to depend on network size, P , in
addition to information costs i. In particular, let marginal costs of network
15
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expansion be denoted by c(i, P ), where:
c(0, ·) = 0 ; c(·, 0) = 0
ci(i, P ) > 0 ; cii(i, P ) ≥ 0 (18)
cp(i, P ) > 0 ; cpp(i, P ) > 0
cip(i, P ) = cpi(i, P ) > 0
As described in (18), c(i, P ) is monotonically increasing in i, for any given
network size P , and monotonically increasing in P , for any given level of in-
formation costs. Convexity in network size P (but not i) is necessary in order
to generate an interior equilibrium. Let c(i, P ) be specified by equation (19),
which satisfies the conditions in (18):
c (i, P ) = γiαP β , where α ≥ 1, β ≥ 2 and γ > 0 (19)
Parameter α is the elasticity of cost c (i, P ) with respect to information costs
i and β is the elasticity of cost c (i, P ) with respect to network size P . Coeﬃcient
γ is a shift factor, which raises (or lowers) network investment cost for given i
and P . Total network investment cost C (P ) = F + 2γiαP β+1is thus convex in
P .
Further, let q(i) be described by:
q(i) = 1− iδ, where δ ≥ 1 (20)
Hence, from proposition (2), the commission rate demanded by the interme-
diary in equilibrium is α∗I(i) = i
δ. Parameter δ thus denotes the elasticity of
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the equilibrium commission rate with respect to information cost i.
Substituting (19) and (20) into equation (8) yields the following expression
for expected profits
E(ΠI) = [1− q(i)]SP 2 − 2Pc(i, P )− F
= SiδP 2 − 2γiαP β+1 − F (21)
Maximising (21) with respect to P yields equilibrium network size in terms
of α, β, γ, δ and S. Analytically, this can be expressed 8 by:
eP = ∙ Siδ−α
γ(β + 1)
¸ 1
β−1
> 0 (22)
Equilibrium network size is given by (22), provided E(ΠI) ≥ 0 and eP ≤ 1,
which shows that the equilibrium pattern of intermediation and trade depend
on the relative values of δ and α. The convexity of network investment costs
gives rise to an interior equilibrium, subject to the constraint imposed by the
size of the market and provided set-up costs F are suﬃciently low relative to
trade surplus S.
Proposition (9) describes the necessary condition for expected profit in the
interior equilibrium to be increasing in i.
8A derivation of (22) is included in Appendix B.
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Proposition 9 Unconstrained expected profit is monotonically increasing with
the level of information costs if (β + 1)δ > 2α.
Proof. For proof see Appendix A.
Condition (β+1)δ > 2α implies that as information costs increase, the direct
matching route worsens relatively more than the cost of network provision.
This gives rise to higher expected profits for the intermediary by relaxing the
constraint on the commission fee the intermediary can demand.
The analysis proceeds by distinguishing between four distinct equilibrium
patterns of network investment. The parameter space can be split into four
ranges, denoted by (A1)-(D1), each corresponding to a diﬀerent set of incentives
for network investment. These are discussed in turn.
(A1) δ > α ≥ 1: For this parameter range, the elasticity of the intermediary’s
optimal commission rate with respect to information costs, δ, exceeds the
elasticity of the intermediary’s marginal cost of network expansion with
respect to information costs, given by α. Hence, as information costs
worsen, the increase in the commission rate the intermediary can com-
mand exceeds the increase in networking cost c(i, P ), making a network
expansion profitable. For this parameter range, optimal network size is
increasing with i.
(B1) δ = α ≥ 1: If the elasticities of the commission rate and c(i, P ) are
exactly equal, then the eﬀects of changing information cost i on the inter-
mediary’s cost and expected revenue exactly oﬀset each other. Hence the
18
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intermediary’s optimal choice of network size is unchanging with i. Note,
however, that while the intermediary’s investment decision is unaﬀected
at the margin, it follows from proposition (9) that unconstrained profits
are increasing with i.
(C1) 2αβ+1 < δ < α: If the elasticity of marginal networking cost c(i, P ) exceeds
the elasticity of the commission rate with respect to i, then it is optimal
for the intermediary to contract network size as information costs worsen.
Despite the contracting network size, unconstrained expected profits are
increasing with i. Recall that β is the elasticity of c(i, P ) with respect
to network size P . Since (β + 1)δ > 2α holds, then within this range of
parameter values, cost c(i, P ) is suﬃciently elastic with respect to network
size P , so as to oﬀset the eﬀects of information cost i on c(i, P ), thereby
raising equilibrium profit overall.
(D1) δ ≤ 2αβ+1 : For this range of elasticities, the commission rate is less respon-
sive to information cost i than is networking cost c(i, P ) and moreover,
the responsiveness of c(i, P ) with respect to P is not suﬃcient so as to
allow a contraction to oﬀset the negative eﬀect on expected profit. Hence,
equilibrium (unconstrained) expected profit is decreasing with i.
The four equilibrium patterns of intermediation, (A1)-(D1), shed light on
how information frictions aﬀect direct and indirect matching technologies. The
model thus suggests that we can learn about the relative elasticities of the costs
of network provision and the probability of direct matching from an empirical
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examination of the impact of changing information costs on intermediation.
The rest of the section formally characterises the interior equilibrium path of
network size, expected trade and expected welfare for parameter ranges, (A1)-
(D1). Further intuition is provided through the discussion of illustrative exam-
ples.
3.1 Equilibrium Pattern of Intermediation (A1)
Proposition 10 If δ > α ≥ 1, then the interior equilibrium is characterised by
the following:
(a) Network size is increasing in the level of information costs i and trade sur-
plus S and decreasing in cost parameters β and γ.
(b) The proportion of indirect trade to total trade is increasing in the level of
information costs i. The relationship between total expected trade and informa-
tion costs is non-monotonic.
(c) The contribution of intermediation to social welfare is positive and increasing
in the level of information costs i.
Proof. Formally, network size, P ∗, expected trade volume, E∗(T ), and ex-
pected welfare, E∗(W ), are described by:
P ∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1oh
Siδ−α
γ(β+1)
i 1
β−1
if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1o
1 if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
E∗(T ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− iδ if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1o
1− iδ +
h
S
γ(β+1)
i 2
β−1
i
δ(β+1)−2α
β−1 if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1o
1 if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
E∗(W ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
¡
1− iδ
¢
S if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1o¡
1− iδ
¢
S + iδSA
2
β−1 − 2γA
β+1
β−1 iα − F if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1o
S − 2γiα − F if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
where A = Si
δ−α
γ(β+1) ,bi = ∙γ 2β−1 ³ Fβ−1´³β+1S ´ β+1β−1 ¸
1
δ(β+1)−2α
> 0
andbbi = hγ(β+1)S i 1δ−α > 0
For a full proof of the above see Appendix B.
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It follows from the interior equilibrium that:
∂P ∗
∂i
=
(δ − α)S
γ (β − 1) (β + 1)
µ
S
γ(β + 1)
¶ 2−β
β−1
i
β+1+(δ−−α)
β−1 > 0 when δ > α
∂P ∗
∂S
> 0 ;
∂P ∗
∂γ
< 0 ;
∂P ∗
∂β
< 0 (23)
Moreover, E∗(T ) can be decomposed into direct and indirect equilibrium trade.
Let direct9 and indirect trade in equilibrium be denoted by, E∗D(T ),and E
∗
I (T ),
respectively, where:
E∗D(T ) =
¡
1− iδ
¢ "
1−
µ
Siδ−α
γ(β + 1)
¶ 2
β−1
#
(24)
E∗I (T ) =
µ
Siδ−α
γ(β + 1)
¶ 2
β−1
(25)
Let the equilibrium direct and indirect trade shares be denoted by sD and sI ,
respectively, where:
sD ≡
E∗D(T )
E∗(T )
=
q(i)
h
1− (P ∗)2
i
q(i)
h
1− (P ∗)2
i
+ (P ∗)2
(26)
sI ≡
E∗I (T )
E∗(T )
=
(P ∗)2
q(i)
h
1− (P ∗)2
i
+ (P ∗)2
(27)
It is straightforward to show that ∂sD∂i < 0 and
∂sI
∂i > 0. Higher information
costs correspond to both a larger network size and a lower probability of direct
matching. Both eﬀects drive the result that the proportion of indirect trade to
total trade is increasing in the level of information costs. Moreover, for i ∈
hbbi, 1i,
where P ∗ = 1, all trade is intermediated, so sD = 0 and sI = 1.
Recall that EDT (W ) is the expected welfare that would prevail if there were
no intermediary in the market. It follows from (17) that E∗(W )− EDT (W ) =
E∗(Π) is a measure of the intermediary’s contribution to social welfare. More-
over, since δ > α ≥ 1, it follows that δ > 2(β+1)α. Hence, from proposition
(9), E∗(ΠI) is increasing in i in the interior equilibrium, so the contribution of
intermediation to social welfare is both positive and increasing in the level of
information costs, where the intermediary is active.
3.1.1 Illustrative Example
Figures (8) - (10) illustrate equilibrium network size, expected trade and ex-
pected welfare, respectively, for i ∈ [0, 1], for parameter values β = 2, γ = 1,
9E∗D(T ) is not to be confused with E
DT (T ). E∗D(T ) represents the equilibrium measure of
direct trade matches, as a component of equilibrium total trade E∗(T ). In contrast, EDT (T )
represents the measure of equilibrium total trade if there were no intermediary in the market.
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δ = 4, α = 2, F = 0.001 and S = {2.5, 3, 4}, which satisfy δ > α ≥ 1 and the
convexity assumption β ≥ 2.
Figure (8) illustrates the positive relationship between optimal network size
and prevailing information costs where the elasticity of the intermediary’s com-
mission exceeds the elasticity of cost c(i, P ) with respect to i. The fixed set-up
cost F implies that information costs must be above a threshold level for inter-
mediation to be profitable in the two-sided market. The optimal network path
is illustrated for (a) S = γ(β + 1), (b) S > γ(β + 1) and (c) S < γ(β + 1),
verifying that network size and threshold level bbi are increasing in S relative to
cost parameters β and γ.
Figure (9) illustrates the eﬀect of intermediation on total expected trade be-
tween the two sides of the market. The intermediary’s network investment pro-
vides access to a more eﬃcient matching technology than direct trade, thereby
raising total trade relative to access to direct matching only. The relationship
between expected trade volume and information cost i is non-monotonic due to
the conflicting eﬀects of information cost i on the constituent parts of expected
trade. For this range of parameters, the intermediary finds it optimal to increase
network size with i, thereby increasing the expected measure of intermediated
trade matches. The impact on direct trade is twofold. First, higher information
cost worsens the probability of a direct match, and second, the expansion in
network size results in a smaller expected pool of unmatched traders in stage 4.
The net eﬀect is ambiguous, giving rise to a non-monotonic relationship between
i and total expected trade E(T ) in equilibrium.
Figure (10) shows that intermediation is welfare improving and that it more
so when information cost is higher.
3.2 Equilibrium Pattern of Intermediation (B1)
Proposition 11 If δ = α ≥ 1 and S < γ(β + 1), then there exists an interior
equilibrium characterised by the following:
(a) Network size is independent of the level of information costs i, increasing in
trade surplus S and decreasing in cost parameters β and γ.
(b) The measure of intermediated transactions is independent of the level of
information costs but represents an increasing proportion of total trade, which
is unambiguously decreasing in information costs i.
(c) The contribution of intermediation to social welfare is positive and increasing
in the level of information costs i.
Proof. If δ = α ≥ 1 and S ≤ γ(β + 1), then equilibrium network size, P ∗,
expected trade volume, E∗(T ), and expected welfare, E∗(W ), are described by:
P ∗ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
0 if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1oh
S
γ(β+1)
i 1
β−1
if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
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Figure 8: Equilibrium A1: path of network size with information costs.
E∗(T ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1− iδ if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1o
1− iδ
h
1−B 2β−1
i
if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
E∗(W ) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
¡
1− iδ
¢
S if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1o¡
1− iδ
¢
S + iδSB
2
β−1 − 2iδγB
β+1
β−1 − F if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
where B = Sγ(β+1) and
bi = ∙γ 2β−1 ³ Fβ−1´³β+1S ´ β+1β−1 ¸
1
δ(β−1)
> 0.
For a full proof of the above see Appendix C.
If δ = α ≥ 1 and S > γ(β + 1), then the unit measure of market size poses
a binding constraint. The constrained optimum network size is thus P ∗ = 1,
provided E(ΠI) ≥ 0. The equilibrium is analogous to that of proposition (5),
with cost given by c(i, 1).
Whether constrained or unconstrained, the equilibrium network size is constant
over the range of values of i where E(ΠI) ≥ 0. It follows that the measure of
intermediated trade is also constant. Where P ∗ < 1, Equations (24) and (25)
simplify to give:
E∗D(T ) =
¡
1− iδ
¢ "
1−
µ
S
γ(β + 1)
¶ 2
β−1
#
(28)
E∗I (T ) =
µ
S
γ(β + 1)
¶ 2
β−1
(29)
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Figure 9: Equilibrium A1: expected trade path.
It follows immediately from (28) and (29) that indirect trade is constant and
direct trade decreases with i as the probability of successful matching declines.
Hence, ∂sD∂i < 0 and
∂sI
∂i > 0. At the limit where P
∗ = 1, all trade is interme-
diated, so E∗D(T ) = sD = 0 and E
∗
I (T ) = sI = 1.
Furthermore, since δ = α ≥ 1, it follows that δ > 2(β+1)α. Hence, from
proposition (9), E∗(ΠI) is increasing in i in the interior equilibrium, so the
contribution of intermediation to social welfare is both positive and increasing
in the level of information costs, where the intermediary is active.
The constrained profit path, where P ∗ = 1 is lower than if the intermediary
could expand the trade network further, but increasing in i nonetheless, since
E(ΠI)|P=1 = iδ (S − 2γ)− F .
3.2.1 Illustrative Example
Figures (11) and (12) illustrate10 the equilibrium network size where δ = α ≥
1. Figure (11) shows that optimal network size is unaﬀected by the level of
information cost i. The intermediary’s optimal investment is again increasing
in S relative to cost parameters β and γ. Figure (12) shows that expected trade
volume decreases monotonically with i, but lies above the expected trade path
that prevails with access to direct matching only.
10Figures (11) and (12) are illustrated for β = 2, γ = 1, α = δ = 3, F = 0.001 and
S = {2, 3}.
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3.3 Equilibrium Pattern of Intermediation (C1)
Proposition 12 If 2β+1α < δ < α, then the interior equilibrium is charac-
terised by the following:
(a) Network size is decreasing in the level of information costs i and cost pa-
rameters β and γ and increasing in trade surplus S.
(b) Indirect trade is decreasing and direct trade increasing in information costs
i. Total expected trade is unambiguously decreasing in information costs i.
(c) The contribution of intermediation to social welfare is positive and increasing
in the level of information costs i.
Proof. If 2β+1α < δ < α, then equilibrium network size, P
∗, expected trade
volume, E∗(T ), and expected welfare, E∗(W ), are described by:
P ∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1o
1 if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1oh
S
γ(β+1)iα−δ
i 1
β−1
if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
E∗(T ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− iδ if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1o
1 if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1o
1− iδ +
h
S
γ(β+1)
i 2
β−1
i
δ(β+1)−2α
β−1 if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
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Figure 11: Equilibrium B1: path of network size with information costs.
E∗(W ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
¡
1− iδ
¢
S if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1o
S − 2γiα − F if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1o¡
1− iδ
¢
S + iδSG
2
β−1 − 2γG
β+1
β−1 iα − F if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
where G = Sγ(β+1)iα−δ and
bi is the11 smaller positive root of
E(ΠI)|P=1 = Siδ − 2γiα − F = 0 and bbi = h Sγ(β+1)i 1α−δ > 0.
The proof of the above is in Appendix D.
It follows from the interior equilibrium that:
∂P ∗
∂i
= − (α− δ)S
γ (β − 1) (β + 1)
µ
S
γ(β + 1)
¶ 2−β
β−1
i
β+1+(δ−−α)
β−1 < 0 when α > δ
∂P ∗
∂S
> 0 ;
∂P ∗
∂γ
< 0 ;
∂P ∗
∂β
< 0 (30)
11This is the threshold above which the intermediary can attain a positive profit. It is
computed based on the constrained profit equation, where P = 1. If F is suﬃciently high,
however, market size is not a binding constraint in the region where E(ΠI) = 0. so the
threshold which applies is: bi|P= eP =
"³
1
γ
´ 2
β−1
³
β−1
F
´ ³
S
β+1
´ β+1
β−1
# 1
2α−δ(β+1)
> 0.
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Figure 12: Equilibrium B1: expected trade path.
Hence, optimal network size is decreasing in i and cost parameters, but increas-
ing in S. Moreover, E∗D(T ), and E
∗
I (T ),are given by:
E∗D(T ) =
¡
1− iδ
¢ "
1−
µ
S
γ(β + 1)iα−δ
¶ 2
β−1
#
(31)
E∗I (T ) =
µ
S
γ(β + 1)iα−δ
¶ 2
β−1
(32)
The decline in network size with information cost i is mirrored by E∗I (T )
when α > δ. The decline in intermediated matches with i increases the measure
of traders seeking a direct match in stage 4. At the same time, a higher i implies
a lower probability of successful direct matching.
Furthermore, since δ > 2(β+1)α, it follows from proposition (9) that E
∗(ΠI)
is increasing in information cost i in the interior equilibrium. Hence, the con-
tribution of intermediation to social welfare is both positive and increasing in
the level of information costs, where the intermediary is active.
3.4 Equilibrium Pattern of Intermediation (D1)
Proposition 13 If δ ≤ 2β+1α, then the interior equilibrium is characterised by
the following:
(a) Network size is decreasing in the level of information costs i and cost pa-
rameters β and γ and increasing in trade surplus S.
(b) Indirect trade is decreasing and direct trade increasing in information costs
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i. Total expected trade is unambiguously decreasing in information costs i.
(c) The contribution of intermediation to social welfare is positive but decreasing
in information costs i.
Proof. If δ ≤ 2β+1α, then equilibrium network size, P ∗, expected trade
volume, E∗(T ), and expected welfare, E∗(W ), are described by:
P ∗ =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi|P=1, 1o
1 if min
nbi|P=1, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1oh
S
γ(β+1)iα−δ
i 1
β−1
if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbi|P= eP , 1o
0 if min
nbi|P= eP , 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
E∗(T ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− iδ if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi|P=1, 1o
1 if min
nbi|P=1, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1o
1− iδ +
h
S
γ(β+1)
i 2
β−1
i
δ(β+1)−2α
β−1 if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbi|P= eP , 1o
1− iδ if min
nbi|P= eP , 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
E∗(W ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
¡
1− iδ
¢
S if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi|P=1, 1o
S − 2γiα − F if min
nbi|P=1, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1o¡
1− iδ
¢
S + iδSA
2
β−1 − 2γA
β+1
β−1 iα − F if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbi|P= eP , 1o¡
1− iδ
¢
S if min
nbi|P= eP , 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
where A = Si
δ−α
γ(β+1) ,
bbi = h Sγ(β+1)i 1α−δ > 0,bi|P=1 is the smaller positive root of E(ΠI)|P=1 = Siδ − 2γiα − F = 0
and bi|P= eP = ∙³ 1γ´ 2β−1 ³β−1F ´³ Sβ+1´ β+1β−1 ¸
1
2α−δ(β+1)
> 0.
For a proof of the above see Appendix E.
The trade eﬀects follow from the proof of Proposition (13). Expected profit
is unconstrained in the interior equilibrium. Since δ ≤ 2β+1α then it follows from
proposition (9) that expected profit and thus the contribution of intermediation
to social welfare is decreasing in the level of information costs i.
3.4.1 Illustrative Example
Figure (13) illustrates12 the pattern of network investment where δ ≤ 2β+1α. For
this range of elasticities, the commission rate is less responsive to information
cost i than is networking cost c(i, P ), giving rise to a negative relationship
between network size and information costs along the interior path. Moreover,
as illustrated in figure (14), unconstrained expected profit, denoted by EU (ΠI)
12 Illustrated for parameter values α = 6, δ = 3, β = 2, γ = 1, F = 0.1, and S = 2.
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rises without limit as i → 0, which implies that in the absence of a binding
market size constraint, the intermediary finds it profitable to invest in an an
ever-increasing network size as information costs tend to zero. Thus below
threshold bbi, equilibrium network size is constrained by the size of the market.
For interval i ∈
h
0,bbii the intermediary’s expected profits follow the constrained
path, denoted by EC(ΠI)|P=1 in figure (14). While unconstrained expected
profit is increasing, constrained expected profit is declining as information costs
tend to zero, rendering the network unviable below some threshold level bi.
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Figure 13: Equilibrium D1: path of network size with information costs.
4 Conclusion
This paper presents a pairwise matching model with two-sided information
asymmetry between trade partners, where an intermediary has the opportunity
to invest in a network of contacts and facilitate trade matching for a success
fee. The framework innovates by examining the role of information costs on
incentives for trade intermediation, thereby endogenising the pattern of direct
and indirect trade.
The framework delivers four key results. First, intermediation unambigu-
ously raises expected trade volume and social welfare by expanding the set
of matching technologies available to traders. Second, convexity in network-
building costs is necessary for both direct and indirect trade to arise in equilib-
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Figure 14: Equilibrium D1: constrained and unconstrained profits.
rium; otherwise, the level of information costs determines whether all trade is
routed through the intermediary or takes place directly.
Third, under assumptions of convexity in the intermediary’s technology, op-
timal network size and hence the equilibrium pattern of trade is shown to depend
on the level of information costs as well as the relative eﬀectiveness of direct and
indirect matching technologies with changing information costs. In particular,
if the probability of direct matching is more responsive to changing information
costs than is the cost of network expansion, then indirect trade oﬀers a relatively
more attractive matching technology than direct trade as information costs rise.
Hence, the proportion of indirect trade to total trade is increasing in the level
of information frictions. Conversely, if networking costs are more responsive
than the probability of a direct match, then the intermediary has an incentive
to contract network size with the opposite trade implications. The model thus
suggests that we can learn about the relative elasticities of direct and indirect
matching technologies from an empirical examination of the impact of changing
information costs on intermediation.
Finally, the model sheds light on the relationship between information fric-
tions and aggregate trade volume, which may be non-monotonic as a result of
conflicting eﬀects of information costs on the incentives for direct and indirect
trade. Higher information costs worsen direct matching prospects but can, at
the same time, provide an incentive for network-building and thus indirect trade
through a trade network.
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Appendix A. Proof of Proposition 9.
Diﬀerentiating (21) partially with respect to i yields:
∂E(ΠI)
∂i
= −P [2ci (i, P ) + PSq0 (i)] (33)
It follows directly that expected profits are increasing with i, if:
ci (i, P ) < −
PS
2
q0 (i) (34)
Substituting for ci (i, P ) and q0 (i) simplifies the condition to:
Pβ+1 <
Sδ
2αγ
iδ−α (35)
Substituting the expression for (interior) equilibrium network size, P ∗ =
h
Siδ−α
γ(β+1)
i 1
β−1
,
and rearranging, yields the necessary and suﬃcient condition for unconstrained
equilibrium profits, E∗(ΠI), to be increasing in i:
(β + 1)δ > 2α (36)
Appendix B. Proof of Proposition 10.
Maximising (21) with respect to P yields the first order condition:
∂E(ΠI)
∂P
= 2P
£
Siδ − γ (β + 1)P β−1iα
¤
= 0 (37)
Solving yields the interior profit-maximising network size, eP , where:
eP = ∙ Siδ−α
γ(β + 1)
¸ 1
β−1
> 0 (38)
The second order condition is found to be:
∂2E(ΠI)
∂P 2
= 2
£
Siδ − γβ(β + 1)P β−1iα
¤
(39)
The second order condition is negative provided P >
h
Siδ−α
γβ(β+1)
i 1
β−1
. Since β ≥ 2,
eP > h Siδ−αγβ(β+1)i 1β−1 and so corresponds to an interior maximum.
The intermediary sets P = eP provided E(ΠI) ≥ 0 and eP ≤ 1. Let bi denote the
threshold level of information costs at which E(ΠI)|P= eP = 0. Since δ > α ≥ 1,
it follows that (β+1)δ > 2α, so, from proposition (9), E(ΠI) is increasing in i in
the interior equilibrium. Hence, E(ΠI) ≥ 0 when i ≥bi. Solving E(ΠI)|P= eP = 0
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for i yields:
bi = "γ 2β−1 µ F
β − 1
¶µ
β + 1
S
¶ β+1
β−1
# 1
δ(β+1)−2α
(40)
Equilibrium network size is thus P ∗ = 0 for i ∈
h
0,min
nbi, 1oi.
Furthermore, eP is increasing in i since δ > α ≥ 1, but network size is constrained
by market size.
Let bbi denote the threshold level of information costs, at which eP = 1. SolvingeP = 1 for i yields: bbi = ∙γ (β + 1)
S
¸ 1
δ−α
(41)
Hence, equilibrium network size is P ∗ = 1 for i ∈
h
min
nbbi, 1o , 1i.
For values i ∈
h
min
nbi, 1o ,minnbbi, 1oi, where E(ΠI) ≥ 0 and eP ≤ 1, network
size follows the interior path P ∗ = eP = h Siδ−αγ(β+1)i 1β−1 . These results are sum-
marised by:
P ∗=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1oh
Siδ−α
γ(β+1)
i 1
β−1
if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1o
1 if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
where bi = ∙γ 2β−1 ³ Fβ−1´³β+1S ´ β+1β−1 ¸
1
δ(β+1)−2α
> 0 and bbi = hγ(β+1)S i 1δ−α > 0.
If 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1o, then the intermediary does not invest in a trade net-
work and all trade takes place directly. The expected trade volume is thus
q(i) = 1− iδ. If min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1, then the intermediary’s network spans the
entire market so all transactions are intermediated and trade volume is 1. For
values of i, min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1o, both direct and indirect trade are ob-
served in equilibrium. Substituting P ∗ into equation (13) yields the equilibrium
expected (total) trade path over this range of information costs. These results
are summarised by:
E∗(T ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1− iδ if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1o
1− iδ +
h
S
γ(β+1)
i 2
β−1
i
δ(β+1)−2α
β−1 if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1o
1 if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
where bi = ∙γ 2β−1 ³ Fβ−1´³β+1S ´ β+1β−1 ¸
1
δ(β+1)−2α
> 0 and bbi = hγ(β+1)S i 1δ−α > 0.
Finally, the piece-wise function E∗(W ) follows directly from substitution of
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P ∗ = 0,
h
Siδ−α
γ(β+1)
i 1
β−1
and 1, respectively, into equation (17). This yields:
E∗(W ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
¡
1− iδ
¢
S if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1o¡
1− iδ
¢
S + iδSA
2
β−1 − 2γA
β+1
β−1 iα − F if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1o
S − 2γiα − F if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
where bi = ∙γ 2β−1 ³ Fβ−1´³β+1S ´ β+1β−1 ¸
1
δ(β+1)−2α
> 0 and bbi = hγ(β+1)S i 1δ−α > 0 and
A = Si
δ−α
γ(β+1)
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 11.
The equilibrium path if δ = α ≥ 1 follows directly from equation (22). If
δ − α = 0, then eP simplifies to:
eP|δ=α = ∙ Sγ(β + 1)
¸ 1
β−1
> 0 (42)
eP|δ=α is a positive constant, that represents the profit maximising network
size. From (42) it follows that equilibrium network size, trade and welfare
depend on whether (i) S ≤ γ(β + 1) or (ii) S > γ(β + 1):
(i) If S ≤ γ(β + 1), then eP|δ=α ≤ 1. Let bi > 0 denote the threshold level
of i at which E∗(ΠI) = 0. Since δ = α, it follows from proposition (9) that
(β + 1)δ > 2α, so E(ΠI) is increasing in i in the interior equilibrium. Hence,
E(ΠI) < 0 when i < bi. Solving E(ΠI)|P= eP = 0 for i and simplifying yields:
bi = "γ 2β−1 µ F
β − 1
¶µ
β + 1
S
¶ β+1
β−1
# 1
δ(β−1)
> 0 (43)
Equilibrium network size is thus P ∗ = 0 for i ∈
h
0,min
nbi, 1oi .
For all values of i ≥ bi, expected profits are positive, so the intermediary
invests in contact-building to eP|δ=α < 1. Equilibrium network size is thus
P ∗ = eP|δ=α for i ∈ hminnbi, 1o , 1i. Furthermore, substituting both P ∗ = 0
and
h
S
γ(β+1)
i 1
β−1
into equations (13) and (17), respectively, yields the piece-wise
functions E∗(T ) and E∗(W ).
(ii) If S > γ(β + 1), then eP|δ=α > 1, so the constraint imposed by market size
is binding. The constrained optimum is thus P ∗ = 1, provided E(ΠI) ≥ 0. The
equilibrium is analogous to that described in proposition (5). P ∗ = 0 below a
threshold value bi, that solves E(ΠI)|P=1 = iδ (S − 2γ) − F = 0, and P ∗ = 1
otherwise.
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Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 12.
The equilibrium path if 2β+1α < δ < α follows directly from equation (22). Since
δ < α, then eP can be rearranged to give:
eP|δ<α = ∙ Sγ(β + 1)iα−δ
¸ 1
β−1
> 0 (44)
From (44) it follows that ∂ eP∂i < 0, so the interior equilibrium path of network
size is declining with information cost i. Moreover, the second order condition
in equation (39) is negative provided P >
h
S
γβ(β+1)iα−δ
i 1
β−1
. Since β ≥ 2 it
must be true that eP|δ<α > h Sγβ(β+1)iα−δ i 1β−1 . Hence (44) corresponds to an
interior maximum.
Letbbi denote the threshold level of information costs, at which eP|δ<α = 1. Solving
for i yields: bbi = ∙ S
γ (β + 1)
¸ 1
α−δ
(45)
Let bi denote the threshold level of information costs at which E(ΠI) = 0. Since
the interior equilibrium path of network size is declining with information cost i,
then for suﬃciently low F , the threshold bi corresponds to a range where P = 1.
If so, then bi solves E(ΠI)|P=1 = Siδ − 2γiα − F = 0 and bi ≤ bbi , where bbi is
described by equation (45). If (for suﬃciently high F ) threshold bi corresponds
to a range where P = eP|δ<α, however, then bi solves E(ΠI)|P= eP = 0. This yields
the threshold level in equation (40) and must exceed bbi, where bbi is described by
equation (45). If the value of eP|δ<α at E(ΠI)|P= eP = 0 exceeds 1, then this
indicates that the constrained optimisation applies and the relevant threshold
is bi solves E(ΠI)|P=1 = Siδ − 2γiα − F = 0.
These results are summarised by:
P ∗=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi, 1o
1 if min
nbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1oh
S
γ(β+1)iα−δ
i 1
β−1
if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
where bi is as above and bbi = h Sγ(β+1)i 1α−δ > 0.
The piece-wise functions E∗(T ) and E∗(W ) follow directly from P ∗ and
equations (13) and (17), respectively.
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 13.
If δ ≤ 2β+1α, then from proposition (9) it follows that E(ΠI) is decreasing in
information cost i in the interior equilibrium. Moreover, since δ < α, the interior
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path is described by eP|δ<α, where eP|δ<α is given by equation (44).
The declining profits along the equilibrium path imply that as i → 0, eP →∞,
hence the constraint that P = min
n eP, 1ois binding. Let bbi denote the threshold
level of information costs, at which eP|δ<α = 1. This corresponds to the threshold
given by equation (45).
Further, letbi denote the threshold level of information costs at which E(ΠI) = 0.
While unconstrained profit is decreasing with i, constrained profit E(ΠI)|P=1
is increasing for low values of i (hence, expected profit is non-monotonic with
information cost i. Case D under convex network-building costs is analogous to
Equilibrium B described in proposition (6) under the linear cost specification).
Let bi|P=1 solve E(ΠI)|P=1 = 0 and bi|P= eP solve E(ΠI)|P= eP = 0. It follows
from δ ≤ 2β+1α and the definition of
bbi that bi|P=1 < bbi < bi|P= eP . Thus, E(ΠI) is
non-negative between these thresholds. Hence, the intermediary is inactive for
low levels of information cost i ≤ bi|P=1and also for i ≥ bi|P= eP .
P ∗=
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if 0 ≤ i ≤ min
nbi|P=1, 1o
1 if min
nbi|P=1, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbbi, 1oh
S
γ(β+1)iα−δ
i 1
β−1
if min
nbbi, 1o ≤ i ≤ minnbi|P= eP , 1o
0 if min
nbi|P= eP , 1o ≤ i ≤ 1
The piece-wise functions E∗(T ) and E∗(W ) follow directly from P ∗ and equa-
tions (13) and (17), respectively.
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